Why it matters
In early September the Chilean shipping company Easter Island and the islands’ Development Corporation announced the restoration of a direct commercial line between Punta Arenas and Puerto Argentino, which has had no regular service since the early 2000s. The venture aims to supply the British occupation from Magallanes, which today depends on shipments from Montevideo, and its first voyage will be made by the freighter Danstar, scheduled between mid-November and early December. In early October the Chilean press reported that intelligence sources anticipate a «critical event» with Argentina on the occasion of that sailing.
The timing coincides with Argentina’s attempt to bring the United Kingdom to arbitration over the Sea Lion oil project under the Law of the Sea Convention. A naval incident would offer London a freedom-of-navigation case just as Buenos Aires seeks to centre the dispute on the exploitation of usurped resources. An unanswered transit, by contrast, would provide the British occupation with a second supply route on the South American continent and weaken the logistical cordon Argentina built around the archipelago, while Magallanes would gain access to a market estimated at some 20 million dollars a year. Each possible outcome distributes those costs and benefits differently.
What Infobae published
On 11 October Infobae published a piece by its Santiago correspondent, Mauricio Palazzo, according to which «Chilean intelligence sources» foresee a «critical event» with Argentina over the voyage of the Danstar, a freighter of the Chilean shipping company Easter Island intended to link Punta Arenas with Puerto Argentino. The text reproduces an investigation by BioBíoChile’s investigative unit released three days earlier and supplements it with statements already known, without providing documentation of its own.
The available information is scarce and repetitive. According to those reports, the vessel would cross the Strait of Magellan carrying food, construction materials, liquefied gas and spare parts, and José Antonio Kast’s government would have ruled out a Navy escort because it is a private operator. The sailing date remains confidential, although 10 November was mentioned in Argentina. The mayor of Punta Arenas, Claudio Radonich, described the initiative as «an agreement between private parties» aimed at challenging Montevideo for the supply of the archipelago.
The original source, an unsigned report
The primary source is the BioBíoChile Investiga article of 8 October, signed by Nicolás Parra Tapia, head of that unit. The text shows no document. It relies on sources who requested anonymity because the matters are confidential and who place the risk at a precise point, the eastern mouth of the strait, when the Danstar enters the 12 miles of Argentine territorial sea. The scenario described is an interception by the Naval Prefecture or the Navy.
According to the same sources, the information reached the Chilean government through the Ministry of Defence, which forwarded it to the Foreign Ministry and the Presidency, on a date that could not be established. Both ministries declined to comment, and an unidentified source in the executive branch merely said that «it is a matter we are dealing with». The following day, La Prensa Austral of Punta Arenas acknowledged that the supposed report has no issuing body and no precise date.
The anonymous character of the information is acknowledged by the very outlets that spread it. BioBío attributes it to sources it does not identify, citing the confidentiality of the matter. La Prensa Austral admits the report has no issuing body or date. La Tercera and Infodefensa do not identify the agency that allegedly produced it either. No Chilean official has confirmed it publicly. Defence Minister Fernando Barros, asked on 8 October, avoided referring to the report and said that «there has been a lot of speculation here» and that «there is no evidence to fear that the rules governing freedom of navigation will be broken». Senator Alejandro Kusanovic, who requested the secret session, acknowledged that there is not enough public information to state that Argentina has decided to intercept the vessel.
The original article also provides two details that Infobae played down. The Danstar is 72 metres long, flies the Chilean flag and has a cargo capacity of 1,389 tonnes. The Drake Passage alternative was reportedly discarded because in Chile it was considered that it could be interpreted as a renunciation of sovereignty over the strait, so that the transit through Magellan, and consequently through Argentine waters off Cape Vírgenes, would respond to a political decision. Perfil, by contrast, attributes the rejection of the Drake route to navigational difficulties and the low profitability of that route.
The only Argentine voice that referred to a possible detention of the vessel does not belong to the State. It is Fernando Morales, president of the Argentine Naval League, who on 6 October appeared before the National Defence, Criminal Legislation and Foreign Affairs committees of the Chamber of Deputies. Morales invoked Article 19 of UNCLOS on non-innocent passage, noted that the decision lay with the Foreign Ministry and admitted that he did not know what measures would be adopted. BioBío itself clarified that Morales represents neither the government nor the Armed Forces, even though its headline said he «threatens to detain» the vessel.
How Chile read it
Within 48 hours the leak entered the Chilean parliamentary agenda. Senator Alejandro Kusanovic, of Magallanes, requested a secret joint session of the Senate’s Defence and Foreign Affairs committees, even while acknowledging that «there is not enough public information to state that Argentina has decided to intercept the vessel». Republican deputies Álvaro Carter, Alejandro Riquelme and Catalina del Real demanded firmness from the Foreign Ministry. Riquelme argued that «no Argentine decree can stand above an international treaty», and Del Real stated that no other country can determine with whom Chile trades.
The executive adopted a more moderate tone. Defence Minister Fernando Barros ruled out an escort for lack of any evidence justifying it and recalled that the treaties guarantee freedom of navigation. Foreign Minister Francisco Pérez Mackenna told the Chamber that «we are not naïve», although such matters are resolved with prudence. The governor of Magallanes, Jorge Flies, by contrast, called for early intervention by the Foreign Ministry to prevent the issue from escalating, as reported by Radio Universidad de Chile.
The Chilean press turned to two specialists. Luis Valentín Ferrada, of the University of Chile, maintains that UNCLOS and the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship prevent Argentina from obstructing transit, and Juan Pablo Berlinger adds that a detention would amount to declaring the 1984 treaty «irremediably void». Several outlets brought into the analysis Decree 457 of 2021 and the statements made in August by the head of the Argentine Air Force, Gustavo Valverde, about Magallanes. The libertarian politician Johannes Kaiser published a column in BioBío asking whether Argentina is preparing «a new legal offensive» over the strait, and Foreign Minister Pablo Quirno responded with an explicit denial.
The result is a narrative in which Magallanes, the Beagle, Antarctica and the Malvinas appear as a single file, with Argentina invariably cast as the threat. In that narrative the archipelago barely appears as a territory under British occupation and subject to a sovereignty dispute. It appears as a market.
Analysis. The possible outcomes
A leak without documentary support, anticipating Argentine conduct announced by no Argentine official, serves a purpose before anything happens, that of assigning responsibility in advance. If the Danstar were intercepted, Chile could claim it had warned of it. If the transit went ahead without incident, Santiago would attribute the outcome to the pressure exerted. In both cases the commercial venture of a Punta Arenas shipping company is covered by the political backing of the Chilean State, an objective the Magallanes business sector has pursued since the agreement with the islands’ Development Corporation was announced in early September, during President Milei’s visit to La Moneda.
Sovereignty over the strait is not in question. On 25 August the Argentine Foreign Ministry stated that its position on Magellan is the one contained in the treaties of 1881 and 1984, which «are fully in force and considered definitive», and the Foreign Minister reiterated that position in his response to Kaiser. The sensitive issue for Argentina is the logistical cordon around the British occupation that the country has maintained since 2010. Today the archipelago is supplied from Montevideo, some 2,000 kilometres away, while Punta Arenas lies about 900 kilometres away. A regular line from Magallanes would provide the islands’ administration with a second South American supplier, closer and cheaper. This comes as the Argentine Foreign Ministry warns that anyone contributing to the «illegitimate» exploitation of Argentine resources will hardly share in the benefits of the country’s growth, and as Argentine legislators ask neighbouring countries to close their ports and airports to companies linked to Sea Lion. The mission of 40 British business people that visited Punta Arenas at the end of September indicates that the other side shares that reading.
The outcome depends on decisions none of the actors has made public. The shipping company has not confirmed the sailing date and the Argentine government has not announced any measure.
The most likely scenario, judging by both governments’ statements, is a transit without incident. Barros referred to the existing speculation, Quirno denied an Argentine offensive over the strait and an official Argentine source dismissed the matter, saying that «there is nothing; they are obsessed». The Chief of the Joint Staff, Marcelo Dalle Nogare, in turn highlighted the «excellent relations» with Chile. If the Danstar crossed the waters off Cape Vírgenes and reached Puerto Argentino without interference, the inaugural voyage would give way to a regular line. The British occupation would gain a supplier 900 kilometres away instead of 2,000, and Magallanes would gain the market it has been seeking for years. In Santiago, the sectors that spread the «critical event» hypothesis could present the absence of incidents as proof of the deterrent effect of the warning. For Argentina’s policy of cordoning off the archipelago, the result would mean a setback of little public visibility but with the value of a precedent.
A second scenario combines free transit with an administrative response. Decree 256 of 2010 remains in force and requires prior authorisation for any vessel crossing Argentine jurisdictional waters bound for the islands or carrying goods, directly or indirectly, between the mainland and the archipelago. The Naval Prefecture already applied it to a Chilean vessel, the tug Beagle of the company Ultramar, in April 2024, without major diplomatic consequences. Proceedings against Easter Island Naviera would only have material effects if the company operates or plans to operate in Argentine ports, which is not publicly known. In Chile, however, it would be read as harassment, and Republican deputies have already anticipated the argument that no decree prevails over a treaty.
Between free transit and detention there are intermediate responses. Escort at a distance by a Prefecture or Navy unit during passage through the territorial sea, or a radio identification call, are routine practices that do not impede navigation. Nevertheless, in the climate created by the leak, any image of an Argentine coastguard vessel alongside the Danstar would be spread in Chile as confirmation of the «critical event», regardless of what actually happened at sea.
The scenario described by the leak, the interception or seizure of the vessel, is the least likely and the one with the greatest consequences. It would conflict with Article 10 of the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, under which Argentina «undertakes to maintain, at any time and in all circumstances, the right of ships of all flags to navigate expeditiously and without obstacles through its jurisdictional waters to and from the Strait of Magellan». It would also occur while Argentina seeks to bring the United Kingdom to Annex VII UNCLOS arbitration over Sea Lion, which would allow London to set a freedom-of-navigation case against a claim centred on resource exploitation. On the Chilean side, President Kast would be exposed to pressure from a parliamentary right that already demands firmness, and the political affinity between La Moneda and the Casa Rosada, which survived the controversy over Valverde’s statements in August, would face its first major test.
There is a less considered outcome, the postponement or suspension of the voyage. The attention of recent weeks increases the risk for a small shipping company operating a 72-metre vessel, whose general manager, Pablo Pacheco, declined to comment on the report. If the date were postponed, the leak would have produced an effect different from the one it announced.
The Chilean government, for its part, has a vulnerability of its own. In December 2011 Chile adhered to the Mercosur declaration that closed the region’s ports to ships flying the islands’ flag, arguing that it does not recognise any jurisdiction or sovereignty of the archipelago’s own. A regular line operating with clearances issued in Puerto Argentino by those same authorities places that position in a difficult spot, whether or not an incident occurs. Louise Ellis, an official of the island administration, denied that the Danstar will supply Sea Lion, a claim that can be verified from the first cargo onwards.
The deadlines are short. The deadline set for the United Kingdom on Sea Lion expires on 12 October and the sailing is planned between mid-November and early December. In any scenario, the Chilean sectors that needed an Argentine adversary for their southern agenda have already obtained a political return from the «critical event» hypothesis. The rest of the question will be settled in the waters off Cape Vírgenes.
Sources
The full list of sources, mostly Chilean and Argentine press with links, appears in the original Spanish version. Key documents: Decree 256/2010 (Boletín Oficial, 17 February 2010); Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile, 1984, Article 10; UN General Assembly Resolution 2065 (1965).